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Generations of Critical Theory? 
 This journal is oriented to re-evaluating early critical theory and is therefore an 
appropriate place to pose some questions about the periodisation of critical theory as a 
whole. Whether or not one accepts a generational model with Adorno, Horkheimer, 
Marcuse et al in the first generation, Habermas, Apel and Wellmer in the second and 
Honneth, Fraser and a cluster of other German and North American theorists in the 
third, a model powerfully criticised in relation to Habermas by Stefan Müller-Doohm 
(2017), there is general agreement that Habermas’s project has always been 
substantially diferent from that of the earlier critical theorists – themselves of course 
quite differentiated despite Horkheimer’s somewhat managerial attempts to present 
them as a team.  
 But whereas Horkheimer’s earlier opposition to Habermas was based on 
anxiety that he was too radical and outspoken (Müller-Doohm 2016: 80-88), later 
commentators have polarised roughly between those who see Habermas’s project as a 
continuation of critical theory in a different mode more adapted to the realities of 
postwar advanced capitalist societies with their apparently stable liberal polities and 
those who see it as an abandonment of some of the more radical motifs of earlier 
critical theory.  
Jay Bernstein (1995: 17), for example, in a book substantially concerned with 
Habermas, advanced a more ambitious specification of the basic motifs of critical 
theory.  Bernstein argues that the "three demands - for a non-instrumental conception 
of cognition and reason, for a cultural Marxism, and for an internal connection 
between those two items - are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a 
critical theory of society".  Bernstein, along with Gillian Rose, argued for a much 
more speculative model of critical theory, oriented more strongly to Adorno than to 
Horkheimer or Habermas, and thus, in his terminology, to issues of meaning and the 
problem of nihilism rather than to those of exploitation and justice. Rose steered a 
rather different course, focussed on law and a deep engagement with Hegel and 
ultimately with religion, but her critique of neo-Kantianism in the first chapter of 
Hegel Contra Sociology (Rose 1981) was intended inter alia to cut the ground from 
under Habermas’s project.   
 Rose’s turn to Hegel, and not to the close-to-Marx Hegel that I feel reasonably 
comfortable with but to an uncompromising Hegel oriented to the Absolute, was also 
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a turn from Adorno, the subject of her PhD and her first book, and certainly from the 
neo-Kantianism which she hunted down, with an almost McCarthyite intensity, not 
just in Habermas but in sociology as a whole. Whereas in The Melancholy Science 
(Rose 1978: 2) she wrote of the Frankfurt School’s ‘particular fusion of the Idealism, 
which arose in opposition to neo-Kantianism, with the revival of Marxism’, three 
years later she was writing that ‘The very idea of a scientific sociology, whether non-
Marxist or Marxist, is possible only as a form of neo-Kantianism.’ (Rose 1981: 2) In 
Rose’s analysis, both Lukács and Adorno tried unsuccessfully ‘to break out of the 
neo-Kantian paradigm of validity and values. Their work has achieved renown as an 
Hegelian Marxism, but it constitutes a neo-Kantian Marxism.’ (Rose 1981: 27) The 
following pages of her book brilliantly follow the story through Adorno to Habermas, 
who also ‘mistreats’ Hegel in order to establish his own methodologically oriented 
critical theory, which ‘has become such a unifying force in the international world of 
sociological reason’. (Rose 1981: 36) 
In both of these rather different démarches, which could be paralleled by 
others in the German debates, there is a common line of critique which fits Habermas 
much more closely than either Horkheimer or Adorno. In a more polemical 
intervention, a conference report whuch was also a brief critique of the undeniable 
aridity of certain parts of the North American Habermas industry, Peter Osborne 
(1998) wrote that Habermasians celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment 'tied firmly to the mast' (p.54), for ‘how are followers of Habermas to 
celebrate Dialectic of Enlightenment in the wake of their forced marriage to 
functionalist sociology and Rawlsian political theory?’ (p. 53)  
The Habermasian counter-argument, in essence, is that expressed by Habermas 
when he described his youthful response to reading Lukács, that it was enormously 
impressive but belonged to a different world. The critical theory of Horkheimer and 
Adorno, especially after the postwar return to Frankfurt, pivoted uneasily between 
utopianism and sociological business-as-usual; what Habermas wanted was an 
engagement with the social sciences which underpinned the concept of critique, much 
as Marx had engaged with economics with the same underlying purpose. Habermas’ 
thought can be seen to steer a course between the twin poles of Kant and Hegel, 
constantly pursuing abstract systems of argumentation of a recognizably Kantian kind 
while remaining sensitive to the Hegelian (or sociological) reminder that formal 
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systems of reasoning exist in a social and historical context.  As Hauke Brunkhorst 
(2009: 219) puts it, 
…the critical theory of society, to whose most important premises Habermas 
adheres, along with Kant, Marx and Adorno, must emerge out of what exists 
and out of its own autonomous development, in other words, thinking with 
Hegel against Hegel, must renew Kant’s radical, normative universalism. 
 
I shall focus first on the concept of critique in earlier and later critical theory, 
before addressing some broader issues as they have played out from the 1930s to the 
present. It seems to me that, rather surprisingly, despite, or perhaps because of, certain 
connections between Critical Theory's concept of critique and that of Kant, and its 
much more direct and obvious dependence on Marx's conception, the term critique is 
very often used in Critical Theory in quite an informal and everyday sense, as in the 
familiar contrast between ‘critical’ and ‘affirmative’ conceptions of culture or 
between a critical and an uncritical attitude to, say, Critical Theory. First, a word 
about Marx. Even if Marx wrote relatively little on metatheoretical issues he had, in 
practice, a fairly coherent conception of critique exemplified in Capital.  There are of 
course rough edges to do with the relation between historical and systematic or 
structural aspects of the model, between what we have come to call social integration 
and system integration and so on, but the basic model in which the understanding of 
the object in its contradictory complexity leads to, or perhaps is identical with, an 
awareness of its historical limits and the need for its replacement seems to me 
reasonably clear. This model was developed independently by Roy Edgley and Roy 
Bhaskar in a notion of critique in which the criticism of a false theory in the social 
sciences sustains, ceteris paribus, a critique of the social conditions which account for 
belief in the false theory.   
 So much in parenthesis about Marxism.  If I am right about this feature of 
critical theory, the kind of detailed discriminations made by Seyla Benhabib in her 
brilliant reconstruction of the concept of critique in Critique, Norm & Utopia are 
indeed reconstructive, I think, rather than something present in the self-understanding 
of the critical theorists - at least until Habermas.  A lot of the work, in other words, is 
not done by the terms 'critique' and/or 'criticism', the two words by which Kritik is 
rendered in English and which enable a distinction between formal and informal 
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usages (though at the cost of reifying 'critique' into some sort of special activity and 
banalising 'criticism' into what Drew Milne, at the conference where I first presented 
some of these ideas, nicely described as 'polemical disagreement and sustained 
grumbling'). The burden is borne instead by related terms - notably the fairly closely 
interdefined terms dialectic(s) and totality - as well as, of course, a particular 
conception of the contemporary human predicament and of the possibilities of 
emancipation.  I shall focus here on the concept of totality in order to defend a version 
of it which (contra the charge that it is tendentially totalitarian) is not only harmless 
but useful.   
 The debt of the early critical theorists to Lukács is of course not in doubt.  He 
certainly helped their journey towards what he later nastily called the Grand Hotel of 
the Abyss, in which he sees them enjoying the best of everything while looking down 
on the poor sods down below and where, to his annoyance, they trashed some of the 
older Marxist furniture in their rooms.  What is perhaps less often emphasised, despite 
Martin Jay's characteristically comprehensive overview, is how much they owed in 
particular to the idea, clearly present in Marx but expressed most emphatically by 
Lukács, that the concept of totality is what distinguishes Marxism from 'bourgeois 
thought' and that 'the primacy of the category of totality is the bearer of the 
revolutionary principle in science' (Lukács 1971: 27).  For Lukács, an orientation to 
the social totality, seen as a complex of fetishism and reification of social relations 
between people, is both necessary and, he implies, sufficient, for the adequate 
understanding of social phenomena such as economic processes.  'It is by virtue of this 
insight [into fetishism] that the dialectical method and its concept of totality can be 
seen to provide real knowledge of what goes on in society' (Lukács 1971: 15).  As he 
put it a little later in Lenin (Lukács 1970: 18), "For every genuine Marxist there is 
always a reality more real and therefore more important than isolated facts and 
tendencies - namely, the reality of the total process, the totality of social 
development".  
Something like this conception can also be found in a slightly more measured 
form in the work of Karl Korsch, as Martin Jay (1986) showed in chapter three of his 
Totality book.  In his 'Introduction to Capital' (p.58, cited in Jay, 1986: 146), Korsch 
writes, Marx's use of 'contradiction' should be understood as metaphorical.  "These 
tensions are all pictured as 'contradictions', and this can be thought of as a 
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sophisticated kind of metaphorical usage, illuminating the profounder connections and 
interrelation between things."   
 Critical Theory from Horkheimer to Habermas adds some ceteris paribus 
clauses (e.g. Adorno pointing out that Mannheim's totalising approach was hardly 
revolutionary, and Habermas making the same point for the totalising conception of 
traditional German gesamte Staatswissenschaft; one might add also the Historical 
School of political economy).  Critical Theory also brackets out Lukács's favouritism 
about the proletariat and his over-slick image of the identical subject-object of history, 
but it keeps the basic message.  This is, I take it, that an account of a social object 
which pays proper attention to its context will more or less necessarily be led to an 
awareness of the conflictual or, if you like, contradictory nature of its relations with 
that context, of the context itself and indeed of the object itself.   
 Thus the problem, pace Goethe, is not so much that everything isolated is 
contemptible, but that things studied in isolation will not have their contradictions 
adequately exposed to the critique they require.   What I want to suggest is that 
Horkheimer's becomes the mainstream conception of critique in critical theory.   It 
coexists however with Adorno's quite substantially different conception, which 
focuses much more on particular concepts, in a curious anticipation of the analytic 
philosophy of language that got going in Oxford long after he'd moved out and on, and 
is driven by a Benjaminian impulse to blow things apart from the inside in a process 
of demystification, rather than to pull them apart by highlighting their complicated 
relations with and in their milieu.   Very crudely, Horkheimer's conception is context-
theoretic; Adorno's is concept-theoretic.   As Wiggershaus (1994: 189) puts it,  
 
For Horkheimer, dialectics in the first place meant thinking in relative 
totalities, and served a critical theory of the sciences as evidence that an 
alternative to the narrowness of the various scientific disciplines and 
metaphysics existed.  For Adorno, dialectics meant the possibility of 
demythologizing and demystifying a broad spectrum of current phenomena.  
This linked him with Bloch and Benjamin.  
 
The distinction is only a rough one, because Horkheimer of course also 
engages in demystificatory conceptual analysis and Adorno is also concerned to stress 
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the social totality, not least in the form of totalitarianism and other pathological 
manifestations of Herrschaft.   And a thinker like Marcuse is probably somewhere 
between these two ideal-typical poles.1 For the moment I want to concentrate on 
Horkheimer's more inclusive and more influential conception, and to defend it against 
certain possible objections.   Horkheimer took, I think, a sensible view of the 
possibilities of creative interaction between philosophy and the social sciences - a 
conception later developed more fully by Habermas in a number of articles about the 
role of philosophy and in his oeuvre as a whole.   A neat illustration of this was the 
memorandum sent from California 'on parts of the Los Angeles Programme of work 
[i.e. Dialectics of Enlightenment] which could not be done by the philosophers' - i.e. 
an analysis of the trends of contemporary capitalism and class stratification.  (Cited by 
Wiggershaus, pp.314f).     In Adorno, the issue is sometimes too polarised for my 
taste, as in his implicit critique of Horkheimer in his essay on 'The Actuality of 
Philosophy' (p.120, cited Jay, 1986: 256): "the idea of science (Wissenschaft) is 
research; that of philosophy is interpretation".  Elsewhere, it is perhaps wrapped up in 
too much pathos, as in the opening sentence of Negative Dialectics that "Philosophy 
lives on because the moment for its realisation was missed".   
In view of Horkheimer's subsequent disavowal of the heritage of earlier critical 
theory (he notoriously kept the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung out of reach in the re-
established Institute for Social Research), and his later decline into rather reactionary 
positions, it is worth noting that in his speech at the reopening of the Institute he 
restated this interdisciplinary charter:  
 
When I speak of the broader points of view that must be linked to individual 
studies, what I mean is that in every question that arises, indeed in the 
sociological attitude itself, there is always an implicit intention to transcend 
existing society.  Without this intention, although it is hardly possible to 
describe it in detail, questions will neither be put in the correct way, nor will 
sociological thinking arise at all.  (Cited by Wiggershaus, p. 445) 
   
                                                 
1 Adorno's conception is of course the one with the closest affinities to deconstruction. 
7 
 It is this earlier interdisciplinary conception which gets somewhat effaced in 
post-war critical theory, and which Habermas attempts to reinstate.  The ways in 
which he does so are fairly familiar, so I shall merely summarise them here.  
First, in chronological order, a conception of Marxism (and by extension of critical 
theory, understood as a more reflective and self-conscious variant (in both senses of 
the word self-conscious - i.e. embarrassed (about Stalinism) as well as self-aware or 
selbstbewusst) as an empirically testable philosophy of history.  Habermas initially 
attaches to this conception a fairly traditional conception of an expressive totality.  
Although he later, under pressure from the Popperian Hans Albert, abandons this 
conception in his second contribution to the Positivismusstreit [the methodological 
dispute between critical theory and Popperian critical rationalism in the early 1960s] 
in favour of a reliance instead on the concept of rationality, totality remains as a 
crucial reference-point. (Jay, 1986: 473; 483) Habermas comes later to see this whole 
model as too traditional.   
 Second, the 'cognitive interests' model, in which empirically given interests of 
the human species (in the control of objective nature, in mutual understanding and in 
emancipation), are constitutive, in a quasi-transcendental manner, of natural science, 
hermeneutically oriented sciences and emancipatory sciences such as Freudian 
psychology and the Marxist critique of ideology respectively. (The technical 
differences in the way these three groups of science are governed by cognitive 
interests need not concern us here.)  Here too, a conception of totality remains central 
to humanistic and critical sciences, whose theoretical concepts are necessarily selected 
with reference to what Habermas (1986 [1963]: 210) calls 'an anticipatory 
interpretation of society as a whole' .  This approach too, which Habermas now sees as 
a detour, founders on a paradox identified by Thomas McCarthy, that nature can 
hardly both be constituted and be the ground of constituting activity; more generally, 
it suffers from an excessively epistemological formulation. 
 Finally, after flirting with the idea of a linguistic foundation for social theory, 
Habermas settles in the late 1970s on a conception of critical social theory which 
spirals off from an analysis of the presuppositions embodied in linguistic 
communication to a broader concept of communicative action set alongside, and prior 
to, those standardly listed in social theory: normatively guided action (Parsonian 
functionalism), strategic action (homo economicus and rational action theory) and 
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dramaturgical action as analysed by Erving Goffman and ethnomethodologists 
following Harold Garfinkel and Aaron Cicourel.  Again, without going into details, 
one should note that a substantial part of the critical element in this conception is the 
totalising move from individual phenomena, or indeed from individual social or 
human sciences such as sociology, to a broader conception.  The emancipatory 
movement in a more limited sense is driven by a form of counterfactual reasoning in 
which human collectivities reflect on whether the social arrangements with which they 
have ended up are capable of justification in universalistic normative terms or whether 
we have slipped or been dragooned into them against what 'we' now recognise as 'our' 
better judgement.   In particular, to put the big question with caricatural brevity, could 
we have had modernity without liberal capitalist exploitation and the wars and other 
authoritarian consequences of the bureaucratic nation state?  
 How defensible is such a conception, at least in its broad orientation? To the 
question raised in another context by Nancy Fraser, 'What's Critical About Critical 
Theory?' (Fraser 1985), an apparently weak and partial response stressing the 
totalising movement of thought, where this necessarily implies also a critique of the 
idea that there is nothing other than instrumental or strategic reason, may be in the end 
not unuseful.  
On the other hand, the parallel critiques of several of the foremost thinkers in the more 
recent critical theory tradition should give pause for thought. I can only briefly 
summarise these lines of criticism, concentrating on Axel Honneth, with whom I 
begin.  
As is well known, Habermas rejected the alleged pessimism of post-war 
critical theory, of what had come to be called the ‘Frankfurt School’, and his principal 
work, the Theory of Communicative Action, published in 1981, aimed to provide the 
missing theory of social action as well as a normative foundation for social criticism 
and what he came to call a discourse ethics.  For Honneth, this was the starting point, 
but he felt that it needed to be complemented by Foucault’s analysis of power and a 
more prominent theoretical, as opposed to merely political, focus on concrete social 
conflicts.2   
                                                 
2 Habermas has of course always been a close observer of, and incisive commentator 
on, the contemporary political scene, but has tended to keep his political writings 
separate from his theoretical work.   
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 An essay originally presented at the legendary Dubrovnik Center in 1981, 
‘Moral Consciousness and Class Domination’, sets the substantive focus for 
Honneth’s subsequent work. Honneth begins with the central principle of critical 
theory, which goes back to Hegel’s critique of Kantian morality, that effective critique 
must not be grounded in abstract principles but must also have a social foundation.     
If a theory is to do more than merely appeal to the ethical standards upon 
which it bases its critique, then it must prove the existence of empirically 
effective forms of morality upon which it can legitimately build. (Disrespect, 
p.80)  
 
This is of course a classically Hegelian trope. Honneth is not yet using the term 
recognition.3 However, his focus on injustice contains the basic theme of his next 
major book, The Struggle for Recognition.  Habermas, he suggests, has escaped the 
pessimistic trap of earlier critical theory by his notion, developed in his 
‘reconstruction’ of historical materialism, of a process of moral evolution 
complementary to the evolution of the productive forces.  But Habermas’s model, he 
maintains, ‘is constructed in such a way that it must systematically ignore all forms of 
existing social critique not recognized by the political-hegemonic public sphere’ 
(p.82).4  Honneth, in other words, is concerned, like Heineken in the beer 
advertisement, to reach the parts which Habermas cannot: ‘all those potentialities for 
moral action which have not reached the level of elaborated value judgements, but 
which are nonetheless persistently embodied in culturally coded acts of collective 
protest, or even in mere silent “moral disapproval” (Max Weber)5.’ (p. 83) 
 
Honneth writes in the Introduction to The Struggle for Recognition (p.1), that he had 
reached the conclusion in his first book, Critique of Power, that  
                                                 
3 The term had cropped up in Habermas’s speech of 1974 on receiving the Stuttgart 
Hegel Prize, ‘Can Complex Societies Construct a Rational Identity’.  Here he writes 
of ‘a flexible identity in which all members of the society can recognize themselves 
[wiedererkennen] and acknowledge [anerkennen], i.e. respect [achten] one another’.   
4 Here of course Honneth is implicitly referring to Habermas’s classic analysis of the 
public sphere and its deterioration under conditions of modern democracy. 
5 Honneth is referring here, he says, to Weber’s Economy and Society (vol. 2, p. 929). 
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any attempt to integrate the social-theoretical insights of Foucault’s historical 
work within the theory of communicative action has to rely on a concept of 
morally motivated struggle.  And there is no better source of inspiration for 
developing such a concept than Hegel’s early, ‘Jena’ writings, with their 
notion of a comprehensive ‘struggle for recognition’.   
As he summarised the theory in his inaugural lecture at Berlin,  
I distinguished three forms of social recognition which can be regarded as the 
communicative presuppositions of a successful formation of identity: 
emotional concern in an intimate social relationship such as love or friendship, 
rights-based recognition as a morally accountable member of society and, 
finally, the social esteem of individual accomplishments and abilities. (p.74)   
What recognition is contrasted with is not misrecognition6 but disrespect, seen as the 
motor and idiom of social conflicts).  As the Internationale goes, ‘nous ne sommes 
rien, soyons tout’, or at least let us be acknowledged for what we are.   
 It cannot I think be denied that this concept captures a good deal of the notions 
of natural justice which motivate many social movements of exploited or suppressed 
people.  Strikes, notoriously, often begin with an apparently trivial violation of some 
perceived right rather than the broader context of ongoing exploitation. Critics of the 
concept have however argued, with more or less emphasis, that there is something 
flimsy about it.  Nancy Fraser, in particular, has argued for the importance of issues of 
redistribution, in a friendly critique of Honneth’s emphasis on recognition.7   
 The range of current social conflicts with which Honneth engages in his own 
work and in that which he encourages at Frankfurt is enough to refute charges that the 
concept of recognition is in some way narcissistic and insubstantial, but it may be 
partly with these criticisms in mind that he tackled, in his Tanner Lectures at Berkeley 
in 2005, the grand Marxist theme of reification.  Reification is of course Lukács’s 
                                                 
6 Recognition in German here would be wiedererkennen, rather than the sense of 
acknowledgement conveyed also by Anerkennung (cf. Jay, 2008).  Habermas, as 
quoted above (n.3), interestingly uses both terms, and Achtung or respect, which in its 
negative form gives ‘disrespect’. It is interesting that the term ‘disrespect’plays such 
an important role in British street culture. 
7 See, for example, Fraser and Honneth, 2003, and the more hostile critiques by Lois 
McNay (2007, 2008). 
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term and not Marx’s, as Gillian Rose showed in the first of her brilliant books).8 It is 
the practical and theoretical treatment of social relations between people as relations 
between things.9  In his account of reification, Honneth stresses the sense of 
‘forgetting’ pointed to by Horkheimer and Adorno in their Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
‘All reification is a forgetting’.10  To say, for example, that I need to shed ‘jobs’ from 
my business in a period of austerity is to forget, in this sense, that these are the jobs of 
the people whose jobs they are.  Honneth’s aim, in a nutshell, is to detach the notion 
of reification from its original productivist philosophical anthropology and to show its 
relevance to a wide range of social pathologies as well as the capitalist exploitation 
and its mystification which was the focus of Lukács’ critique.  
Critical theory, for Honneth, is alive and well as resuscitated by Habermas;11 it 
needs to be tweaked back into a direction which one could call post-marxist, if the 
term had not been attached to rather different intellectual and political projects, and 
which also recalls Marx’s early concern with a wide variety of social conflicts.12 Most 
important of these, I think, is his bold rehabilitation of a strong notion of social 
pathology which had tended to be confined to seminar discussions of Durkheim’s 
distinction between the normal and the pathological, and journalistic phrases about 
our ‘sick’ or ‘broken’ societies. In the first essay in Disrespect, Honneth ties this to 
the tradition of ‘social philosophy’ which, as he notes, has withered away in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries into a sub-discipline of political philosophy.  Against this 
current, Honneth aims to restore it in relation to ‘processes of social development that 
                                                 
8 This has a lesson for all of us who pretend to some form of scholarship.  Everyone 
she spoke to said that of course Marx used the term throughout his work; they 
couldn’t of course say just where, off the cuff, and so on.  One day I triumphantly 
pointed out to her a use of the term buried in volume 3 of Capital (which of course 
was published posthumously and therefore might not count), but this is very much the 
exception which proves the rule. (See The Melancholy Science, p. 167, n.20.) 
9 I deliberately use the ambiguous term ‘treatment’, since what is at issue is not a 
purely cognitive process. 
10 This quotation appears as one of two epigraphs at the beginning of the lecture 
series; the other is from Wittgenstein, On Certainty: ‘All knowledge is based on 
acknowledgement’ (Anerkennung). 
11 See for example Honneth 1985 and Chapters 3 and 5 in Disrespect.  
12 See Lubasz, 1977.  I do not of course mean to suggest that Marx lost, or Habermas 
lacks, these concerns; just that the focus on the proletariat in Marx’s later work, and a 
more diffuse notion of humanity as a whole in Habermas’, might be complemented by 
an approach which engages with a wide range of substantive conflicts.  
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can be viewed as misdevelopments…’ (p. 4).  The ‘diagnosis of the times’, a term 
introduced into Britain by Karl Mannheim, becomes specifically a diagnosis of social 
pathology, Thus ‘In order to be able to speak of a social pathology that is accessible to 
the medical model of diagnosis, we require a conception of normality related to social 
life as a whole.’ (p.34)  In what he calls ‘a weak, formal, anthropology’ (p. 42)13, 
Honneth gestures towards ‘an ethical conception of social normality tailored to 
conditions that enable human self-realization’. (p. 36)  
 This important initiative makes explicit something which had been latent in 
much of critical theory.  The theme of suffering of misdevelopment and ‘damaged 
life’ (Adorno 1951) pervades the work of the first generation of critical theorists, and 
Habermas’ reworking in Theory of Communicative Action of Marxist, Weberian and 
indeed Parsonian theory (Holmwood, 2009) contains a substantial discussion of social 
pathologies.  Honneth has however pushed this theme further, against the limits of the 
organic analogies and functionalist assumptions which he, like most of us these days, 
would find unacceptable.  
This is brought out in what is more or less the title essay of the perhaps 
ambiguously titled Pathologien der Vernunft.  Geschichte und Gegenwart der 
Kritischen Theorie. In this essay, ‘A Social Pathology of Reason. On the intellectual 
heritage of critical theory’,  Honneth suggests that, although we are now a similar 
distance from the beginnings of critical theory as its protagonists were from the last 
representatives of classical idealism (p. 28), critical theory is still linked by its model 
of ‘…socially effective reason: The historical past is to be understood as a 
developmental process whose pathological malformation by capitalism can be 
overcome only by a process of enlightenment carried out by those affected.’ (p. 30)  
Critical theory therefore stands out in the present century against a context dominated 
by a liberal conception of justice which fails to ground its critique in social and 
historical explanation and by Foucauldian or hermeneutic lines of social criticism.    
What Honneth offers, then, is not so much a critique of Habermas as an 
alternative programme lying in a similar line of development and engaging recently 
with, somewhat surprisingly, the work of Talcott Parsons and Jeff Alexander. Seyla 
Benhabib, by contrast, develops a critique inspired both by Hegel and by 
                                                 
13 In the sense, of course, of philosophical anthropology (see Honneth and Joas, 1980).  
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contemporary feminism, which had also underlain Nancy Fraser’s classic piece 
‘What’s critical about critical theory?’ (1985); Benhabib’s Critique, Norm, and 
Utopia came out the following year.  Focusing on Habermas’s Theory of 
Communicative Action (1981), Fraser argues that it  
...fails to theorize the patriarchal, norm-mediated character of late-capitalist 
official-economic and administrative systems. Likewise, it fails to theorize the 
systemic, money- and power-mediated character of male dominance in the 
domestic sphere of the late-capitalist lifeworld...Thus, while Habermas wants 
to be critical of male dominance, his diagnostic categories deflect attention 
elsewhere, to the allegedly overriding problem of gender-neutral reification.  
 
In her positive proposals, Benhabib, to summarise rather brutally, plays off 
Hegel against Habermas, as Honneth came to do, in the service of what she calls a 
‘community...of needs and solidarity’ (p.341).  The phrase is in fact Habermas’s own, 
and solidarity, as Peter Dews perceptively stressed in the title of his edited volume of 
interviews, Autonomy and Solidarity, is a core concept for him, but Benhabib argues 
that his discourse ethics is shaped too much by a formalistic conception of rights – 
something which his engagement with legal theory in Between Facts and Norms 
(Habermas 1992) did little to mitigate. Her aim is ‘to situate reason and the moral self 
more decisively in the contexts of gender and community, while insisting upon the 
discursive power of individuals to challenge such situatedness in the name of 
universalistic principles, future identities, and as yet undiscovered communities. 
(Benhabib 1992: 8.)  In Benhabib’s later work, this is a red thread running through to 
her analyses of the politics of multicultural Europe.  
For Jay Bernstein, Benhabib does not go far enough. ‘The meaning of 
universality in the context of need interpretations will have to shift away from the 
paradigm of communication altogether since it will have an epistemic component 
equivalent to whatever is involved in recognizing others in their concrete 
articularity...’ (Bernstein 1995, p. 154). Where Honneth turned to Hegel, Bernstein 
also argued for the relevance of Adorno, and particularly his theory of art – the main 
focus of his current work. Habermas’s sociological account of the colonisation of the 
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life-world, Bernstein suggested in passing in 2001, in Adorno: Disenchantment and 
Ethics, p. 45, ‘...theoretically colonises the very existence it aims to protect. The 
aphoristic procedure of [Adorno’s] Minima Moralia can thus usefully be seen as a 
corrective to theoretical colonisation; it aims to express as well as reflect (on) the 
experience of the individual’. If this judgement sounds a little harsh, it is certainly true 
that Habermas briskly asserted, in a ‘Reply to my Critics’, that a historical materialist 
conception of progress, as he had reformulated it, or presumably any other, ‘does not 
at all touch the sensitive zones of the good life – which are, in my view, beyond the 
grasp of theory.’14 (Thompson and Held 1982: 228) 
I have been dwelling on these works of the 1980s and 1990s not for the sake of 
nostalgia, but because I think they continue to map out crucial aspects of 
contemporary social and political theory. As for the question of where all this leaves 
Habermas today, my inclination, contra Gordon Finlayson, Stefan Müller-Doohm and 
Habermas himself, is to stress the continuities in his thinking and his closeness to 
what I continue to think of as the first generation of critical theory. Habermas was for 
a long time reticent about discussing this relationship, and Müller-Doohm’s superb 
biography adds some more material to the reasons for this distance.  
Habermas has also not been keen to found a school. During his career as a full-
time academic Habermas sponsored only two Habilitation theses, those of Albrecht 
Wellmer and Axel Honneth, and Claus Offe, who should know, doubts that one can 
speak of a Habermasian school. (Müller-Doohm 2016: 206) Habermas declined to be 
considered for the Directorship of the Institute for Social Research, and when 
Adorno’s chair was to be filled in 1970, he proposed Leszek Kołakowski and 
defended his suggestion, against critics in the Faculty, with a warning against seeing 
critical theory as ‘a kind of institution which has to be preserved by recruiting true 
believers’. (Müller-Doohm 2016: 165) When inviting Offe in 1970 to join him in the 
move to Starnberg he wrote that the situation at the Institute was desolate and that he 
was ‘tired of bearing the social psychological burden of a substitute father’ (Müller-
Doohm 2016: 167-8). And yet he wrote in a letter to SPIEGEL in 1973, in response to 
the suggestion that his communication theory was a rejection of Marxism, ‘One can 
‘distance’ oneself from people or utterances, but not from scientific traditions which 
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exist after all to be tested and revised.’ (Müller-Doohm 2016: 136) As he said in 1981, 
he was not a Marxist in the sense of a religious declaration, ‘But Marxism gave me 
the impulse and the analytical means to investigate how the relationship between 
democracy and capitalism has developed’ (Kleine Politische Schriften I-IV, 517). And 
when he returned to Frankfurt and said in his first lecture that he ‘did not intend to 
continue the tradition of a school’ he went straight on to say that he couldn’t ‘stand at 
this lectern without recalling the figure and the influence (Wirkungsgeschichte) of 
Adorno’ (Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit, p. 209).   
I have written elsewhere about the continuities and discontinuities in 
Habermas’s relationship to historical materialism (Outhwaite 2014). More relevant, 
perhaps, is to ask how far he has responded to criticisms from the third generation 
and, incipiently, a fourth generation of critical theorists such as Rainer Forst in 
Frankfurt, Martin Saar in Leipzig, Simon Susen at City University in London, Robin 
Celikates in Amsterdam or Rahel Jaeggi in Berlin. There are several places to look. 
First, of course, his own main works, including prefaces to later editions of books 
such as Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Knowledge and Human 
Interests. Second, the various volumes of essays on his work to which he has 
contributed a response. Third, the interviews he has given and, fourth and finally, the 
secondary literature and biographies by Müller-Doohm and others.  
Müller-Doohm’s biography provides useful signposts. One is a remark from 
Habermas himself (at the Wuppertal conference of 2012 on his relationship to 
historical materialism and now documented in Rapic 2014), which Müller-Doohm 
uses as an epigraph to the final section of his biography: ‘Wer kennt schon seine 
wirklich spekulativen Motive?’ (Who really knows the true motives of their 
speculations?). (Müller-Doohm 2016: 424) As Müller-Doohm goes on to spell out, 
Habermas is more conscious than most people of the creative tension between 
intuitions which emerge from one’s life and the demands of scholarship and truth.15  
As he said in an interview: 
There is also a dogmatic core to my convictions, of course. I would rather 
abandon scholarship than allow this core to soften, for those are intuitions 
which I did not acquire through science, that no person ever acquires that way, 
                                                                                                                                            
rare) comments on a communist future.  
16 
but rather through the fact that one grows up in an environment with people 
with whom one must critically engage (sich auseinandersetzen), and in whom 
one recognizes oneself’ (Peter Dews (ed), Autonomy and Solidarity, 2nd edn, p. 
127; translation modified).  
And yet, ‘When one is oriented to questions of truth...one should not try, as Heidegger 
and Adorno both did, to produce truths outside of the sciences and to wager on a 
higher level of insight... (Dews, p. 126).  Truth emerges, then, from scholarly 
exchange.  
Borrowing Göran Therborn’s phrase ‘Vorsprung durch Rethink’ (Marxism 
Today, February 1989), we might consider some of Habermas’s rethinks, in roughly 
chronological order. First, his abandonment of the model of what he called an 
‘empirically falsifiable philosophy of history’ in favour of a kind of naturalised 
epistemology with the model of cognitive interests, followed by the qualifications he 
introduced in his 1973 ‘Postscript’ to Knowledge and Human Interests. As he said in 
an interview, ‘There is one difficulty...which McCarthy showed me. Namely, once 
you accept that there is a category of sciences which I now...call reconstructive, where 
do you place them?’ (Dews 1992: 193). (This parallelled also in his later turn from an 
anti-realist position in Knowledge and Human Interests to one which is much more 
sympathetic to realism and framed in terms of reconstructive science.  
Then we might think of Legitimation Crisis (1973) and The Reconstruction of 
Historical Materialism (1976) as, among other things, a response to the rather strident 
Marxism of the 1968 years.  By then Habermas was making the major turn in his 
thought, to his mature model of communicative action; when I edited the Habermas 
Reader in the mid-1990s he was distinctly cool about the idea of including a 
substantial amount of his earlier work, which he saw as superseded. By the time of 
Theory of Communicative Action (1981), closely followed in 1984 by a volume of 
‘earlier studies and additions’, Habermas was taking some rather ill-judged side-
swipes at Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida, and his reconciliation with them, at least as 
people though perhaps not fully with their ideas (unlike, for example, Wellmer and 
Honneth, who were always much more open and conciliatory), is another modification 
of his initially harsh approach.  
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1989 brought Habermas up short, like all of us, and he had eventually to revise 
his rather negative initial response to the Wende, which at first he saw, unusually for 
him16, in rather parochial West German terms. It is worth noting that, although 
Habermas did not devote much of his published work before 1989 to an analysis of 
state socialist societies, his approach made possible some of the most creative work in 
the analysis of these regimes. Thus, whereas more orthodox Marxist approaches 
concentrated on the issue of how state socialist modes of production should be 
understood, Habermas and others, such as Andrew Arato, using a Habermasian 
approach, put these questions in a rather broader framework. 1989 was also the time 
when Habermas wrote a substantial preface to the new German edition of Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, which contains a number of qualifications about 
the way he had made the argument in 1961. (Calhoun 1992) In his more recent work 
on legal and democratic theory, Habermas has returned to this theme, stressing the 
interplay between law and democratic politics and the relation of both of these to 
more informal processes of public discussion. Just as important as the formal relations 
between the legal and political institutions of the constitutional state are the quality 
and extent of public communication. The public sphere, he writes in Between Facts 
and Norms (1992), should not be seen as an institution or organization, but as ‘a 
network’ in which ‘flows of communication are filtered and synthesized in such a way 
that they condense into public opinions clustered according to themes’. In the modern 
world, these processes of communication are increasingly mediated, in both senses of 
the word: they take place both at a distance and increasingly via the mass media. In 
other words, rational discussion of public issues is not confined to face-to-face 
encounters in larger or smaller assemblies, taking place in real time. What this might 
mean in practice for a political theory of communicative democracy remains an issue 
that clearly requires further exploration. 
His focus on law and democratic theory, in the large research project 
culminating in Betwee n Facts and Norms (1992) is not so much a rethink as a 
clarification, that the communication action model did not after all intend to present 
all politics as an eternal academic seminar or an anarchist utopia. If there is a rethink 
here, it is perhaps his rather problematic shift from a largely critical take on 
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juridification (Verrechtlichung) in Theory of Communicative Action to what many 
critics have seen as an uncritical approach to law.  
Perhaps the most significant modification of Habermas’s approach might 
however be a text which is easily overlooked: a volume of essays published in 1996 
called The Inclusion of the Other. Although The Inclusion of the Other does not go as 
far in the direction of a greater openness to difference as the title perhaps suggests, it 
does however contain a discussion of group rights in multicultural societies.  Here he 
responds, among other things, to critiques of the formalism of his model. In the 
preface to The Inclusion of the Other he stresses that he is defending  
...a morality based on equal respect for everybody and on the universal 
solidarity and responsibility of each for all. Postmodern suspicion of an 
indiscriminately homogenizing universalism fails to grasp the meaning of this 
morality...a universalism that is highly sensitive to differences.  
This volume, like The Postnational Constellation, marks Habermas’s engagement 
with globalisation and European integration, which has become the major focus of his 
public interventions. Here, as I have described elsewhere, there is a growing 
undertone of pessimism alongside a bold defence of the European project. I should 
also mention a turn not taken. Despite his engagement with religious belief and a 
conception of the ‘post-secular’ which annoys both secularists like me and believers 
like Hans Joas, he has stressed that he has ‘become old but not pious’.  
 
Finally, I should confront the real question at issue: where is Habermas today? 
More sharply, has his project come to an end, not just in the sense that he is old 
enough to ease off (he announced that his most recent (twelfth) volume of collected 
political writings, The Lure of Technocracy, would probably be the last), but that 
perhaps there is anyway little more to add and that the project has run out of steam?  It 
is certainly possible to argue that you don’t need two big volumes to explicate the idea 
of communicative action, or 667 pages to trace the links between law and democracy, 
nor however many books and articles to explicate and defend the moral point of view.  
For my money, though, these remain stupendous achievements which bear 
comparison, sub specie aeternitatis (or at least from the perspective of someone now 
also enjoying retirement), with those of an earlier generation of ‘young Hegelians’.  
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Note: this paper draws on a contribution to a conference on ‘Critique and 
Deconstruction’ at the University of Sussex in July 1998, a review article 
‘Recognition, Reification and (Dis)respect’, Economy and Society 38, 2, May 2009, 
pp. 360-7, and on my Gillian Rose Memorial Lecture, ‘Habermas Today’, also at 
Sussex, in December 2014.  
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